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The given article displays the case of Sidis v. F­R Publishing Co., which features a suit of a former adolescent prodigy, 
William Sidis against the New Yorker newspaper for publishing an article “Where Are They Now? April Fool” where 
his biography as well as a then­present style of life were portrayed. This case possesses a particular concordance for 
the theory of “right to be forgotten” as a derivative of right to privacy in common law as well as having triggered the 
issues of celebrity­related public interest and article newsworthiness tests applied by US courts in later cases.
I. Introductory clause
1. Statement of issue. The definition of right to be forgotten,  
its scope and place in human rights law
The right of privacy as separate right deriving from common law jurisdictions and had a prominent 
development in United States common law though having some protogene routes in UK common law. 
The emergence of the right to privacy in the United States is connected with an article by American 
scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, but several privacy cases occurred way before 
this treatise1. The violation of the right is recognized as an independent tort and the right to privacy 
is treated as common law right: as it was stated in Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Co.: “The modern 
doctrine of the right to privacy is a development of the common law ro fill a need for the protection 
of the interest which person has in living without unwarranted publicity”2. The right to privacy is a 
limited right and does not protect an individual from a number of occurrences3. The right to privacy 
1  See; KRAMER, I. R. The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis (1990), Catholic Uni-
vesity Law Review, Vol. 39, Issue 3 (Spring 1990), Article 3, p. 705–708; MENSEL, R. E., The Anti-Progressive Origins 
and Uses of the Right to Privacy in the Federal Courts 1860–1937 (2009), The Federal Courts Review, Vol. 3, iss. 2, 
p. 111–112. Several antique specimen of the 19th century also existed in UK common law, generally see. CUMMINGS, J. J., 
Television and the Right to Privacy (1952), Marquette Law Review, Volume 36, Iss. 2 (Fall 1952), p. 157–158. For an 
early prominent UK common law privacy violation case, Prince Albert v. Strange (1848) see generally SOLOVE, D. J.; 
RICHARDS, N. M., Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 2007, GW Law Faculty Publications 
& Other Works, Vol. 96:123, p. 130–131. For a discussion on the earliest privacy-related cases see also, POUND, R. In-
terests in Personality, 1915, Harvard Law Review, Vol. XXVIII (February 1915), No. 4, p. 347–348 and footnoote 7. One 
privacy-related case, appearing 23 years before Warren and Brandeis declared privacy an independent tort, Grigsby and 
Wife v. R. J. Breckinbridge (1867), was classified as a privacy case in Brents v. Morgan, see in detail: Brents v. Morgan, 
221 Ky. 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927), at. 770. 
2  Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Co., 247 Iowa 817 (Iowa 1956), at. 821.
3  Such were well summarized in a number of earlier cases. In Brents v. Morgan, the Court classified these deroga-
tions as follows: 1) the right of privacy ceases when the matter is a matter of public and general interest; 2) it doesn’t 
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is examined by the scale of ordinary sensibilities4 and common law does not afford protection on 
basis of the plaintiffs hypersensitivity, that is, it is not accounted: as stated by the Supreme Court 
of Florida in the case of Cason v. Baskin: “The protection afforded by the law to this right must be 
restricted to “ordinary” sensibilities” and can not extent to supersensitive or agoraphobia. In order 
to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy, an act must be of such a nature as a reasonable man 
can see might and probably would cause mental distress and injury to anyone possesed of ordinary 
feelings and intelligence”5. The US common law distinguishes defamations from privacy violations 
by separating injuries to one’s reputation, character or property from “injury to the person”6 which 
may be overally described as an insult of one’s mental integrity and private feelings7. The disctinction 
between the foregoing torts were well interpreted by the California Court of Appeal in Fairsfield v. 
American Photocopy etc. Co: “The gist of the cause of action in a privacy case is not injury to the 
character or reputation, but a direct wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to the feelings 
without regard to any effect which the publication may have on the property, business, pecuniary 
interest, or the standing of the individual in the community”8. A defamation is displayed in the field 
of blackening one’s reputation, whether of a living or a deceased person, it commonly contains false 
statements and assumptions (however, in earlier cases, United States courts came to a conclusion 
that not entirely false facts are directly libelous, but the facts which bring a person to contempt and 
ridicule9), a libel is malicious by its nature and is to be distinguished from the so-called “injury to the 
person”10 or, as R. Pound proposed in his prominent treatise “Interests in Personality”, an “interest in 
the peace and comfort of one’s thoughts and emotions”11. Defamations may also involve a somehow 
indirect reference to a person and is actionable in case the plaintiff is capable of proving the statements 
are attributed particularly to him12. The so-called “false light” cases are not stringently defamatory in 
case they contain minor inaccuracies and do not outrage community decency13. The right to privacy 
bore several derivatives which generally fall within the scope of the right to privacy violations, but are 
divergent by some circumstances. The first, the “relational right to privacy”, or, as Larremore denoted 
“post mortem privacy”14, displays an action on privacy invasion of an already deceased person. It 
was unleashed since a prominent case of Schuyler v. Curtis way back in 189515 which declared that 
prohibit priviledged communication unless breaking the rules of slander and libel 3) there is no recovery for an oral 
publication 4) the right to privacy does not subsist when the individual publishes these facts itself or they are published 
with its consent (Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927), at. 770–771). In the case of Reed v. Real Detective 
Pub. Co it was given in a somehow alternate way: 1) it surrenders with the death of the person 2) there was consent given 
to publication; 3) when the plaintiff became a public character and hence sacrificed a major part of his privacy; 4) from 
ordinary dissemination of news and events; 5) in regard with a person to which the community has got a licit interest; 
6)  when the information would be of public benefit (Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co. 63 Ariz. 294 (Ariz. 1945), at. 304).
4  ZOLICH, J. Laudatory Invasion of Privacy (1967), Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 16, iss. 3, art. 6, p. 533.
5  Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198 (Fla. 1945), at. 215.
6  Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P. 2d 133, 63 Ariz. 294, at. 301.
7  POUND, R. Interests in Personality. Harvard Law Review, 1915, Vol. 28 (XXVIII), No. 4 (February 1915), 
p. 356–357, 363–364.
8  Fairsfield v. American Photocopy etc. Co (1955), 138 Cal App. 82, at. 86.
9  Morey v. M. J. Association, 123 N.Y. 207 (N.Y. 1890), at. 209.
10 See. Reed v. Real Detective Pub Co (1945). 162 P. 2d 133, 63 Ariz. 294, at. 301.
11 POUND, R. Interests of Personality (1915), Harvard Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Feb. 1915), p. 362–363.
12 See. Gibler v. Houston Post Co, 310 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), at. 384, with a reference to Prosser.
13 See. for instance, Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne and Heathe, 188 Misc. 479 (N.Y. Misc. 1947), at. 482–483.
14 LARREMORE, W. The Law of Privacy (1912), Columbia Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 8 (Dec. 1912), p. 706.
15 HAND, A. N. Schuyler against Curtis and the right to privacy (1897), The American Law Register and Review, 
Vol. 45 O.S. (36 N.S.) December 1897, No. 12, p. 745–759.
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the death of person deprives it from all the rights, including privacy16. This was however altered in 
Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, a sophisticated per curiam case, where an unauthorized photograph 
of a dead deformed child was published in a newspaper and the court held that the right of action can 
be in the forebearers17. There have been multiple interpretations of the Bazemore case18, including 
the opinions of courts in similar cases19. The “relational privacy” concept did not acclimatize in the 
common law apart from some cases where other interests, such as breach of contract, or trust were 
abused20. The second derivative, yet never unanimously entitled, deals with disclosures of one’s 
past facts and events. Being tentatively called “right to be forgotten” or “right to oblivion”, it is a 
complicated legal concept in the field of the right to privacy with a vague normative scope. Still, I 
would define it in the undergoing categories:
1)  a common law concept emerging from US common law that represents a recovery on grounds 
of disclosure of one’s past, subjectively irrelevant, embarassing or displeasing, sometimes 
meticulously sealed private events and facts by the means of mass media – the press, television, 
broadcast and others. The abiding component of such cases was the existence of a time lapse 
between events and their publication, which may have altered from a number of months21 and 
2 years22 to a decade23, two decades24, from twenty to thirty years of time lapse25 and even 
more26. This concept is frequently attributed to a concept of so-called “past news”, namely 
a revivification of the bygone events in reprints of old newspapers and revitalization of old 
news27; disclosure of truthful life stories28; an unveilment of an elected office position aspirant’s 
criminal past29, a deplorable life story of an ordinary woman who chose to be espoused at an 
immature age of fourteen30, revelation of one’s sensitive personal data, barely relevant for 
16 Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434 (N.Y. 1895), at. 446–447.
17 Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 (Ga. 1930), at. 262.
18 COMMENTS (Washington University Law Review): Torts – Right of Privacy – No Right of Recovery for Publica-
tion Concerning Deceased Relatives (1953), Vol. 1953, iss. 1, p. 111; see the opinion on Bazemore in Cox Broadcasting 
Corp v. Cohn; where it was held that the “relational” right to privacy still was recognized in that case without other inter-
ests abused (see. Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (1973), at. 62–64).
19 See Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161 (1956), at. 167–168 and Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Co., 247 Iowa 817 
(Iowa 1956), at. 826.
20 See generally: Douglas v. Stokes (1912); Fitzsimmons v. Ollinger Mortuary Assn (1932).
21 See generally Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1957).
22 Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N. D. Cal. 1954), at. 328.
23 See generally e.g. Barbieri v. News Journal Co. (1963) – 10 years, Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Assn. (1971) – 
11 years.
24 See. Conklin v. Sloss (1978), 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, at. 243 – 20 years.
25 See. Smith v. Doss (1948), 251 Ala. 250 (Ala. 1948), at. 252 – 25 years until the death of the person concerned, the 
actual time lapse between the event (1905) and publication (1946) tolled 41 year; In the present case, Sidis v. F-R Publish-
ing Co. (1940) – the plaintiff’s heyday was about 27 years before the publication; in Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. (1961), 
the events described were mostly over 20 years of remoteness (see. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co (1961), 193 Cal. App. 2d 
111, footnote 1–2).
26 See. Street v. National Broadcasting Co. (1981) – about 36 years.
27 See in detail: Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co. 129 F Supp. 817 (1955), at. 828–829; Barbieri v. News-
Journal Company, 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963), at. 773–774; Conklin v. Sloss (1978), 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, at. 242.
28 See. Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250 (Ala. 1948), at. 251–252.
29 For instance, in Beruan v. French, the plaintiff was a candidate for a secretary-treasurer at International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and tempted to be elected in December 1970. The defendants distributed a 
letter to oppose his candidacy. It contained facts of the plaintiff’s past, which counted on six criminal convictions between 
1943 and 1958. As a result, the plaintiff lost the competition. The Court found that the criminal records were relevant to 
determine his fitness for an office in a labor union and so the plaintiff lost. See. Beruan v. French (1976), 56 Cal. App. 3d 
825, at. 827–829.
30 See. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications (1962), 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, at. 736–740.
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one’s office fitness31, past scandalous incidents of an ex-attorney32, unsavory past events of 
an allegedly rehabilitated criminal33, as expunged criminal records may be newsworthy in 
case of a person with criminal past applies for a public office; though it may be convergent 
to do so, there may be no “right to oblivion” for an aspirant’s past34, as the subsistence of 
such facts, irrespective of how remote are they, have an impact on his fitness for office35. A 
common law “right to be forgotten” conception also subsists in the field of defamation36 when 
the defamatory statements are connected with past life events. In UK, a wayward prototype of 
“right to be forgotten” existed in libel law: in a 1849 decision by an English court it was ruled 
that a libel suit was not actionable as the limitation period for a libel action could not overcome 
more than six years37. Apart from US and UK common law, a “common law”-based right to be 
forgotten has received a somehow modest coverage in international law – the practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights possesses 3 outstanding cases, Schwabe v. Austria (held that 
the interference with freedom of expression was unjustified38); the case of Tolstoy Miloslavsky 
v. UK (it was held that injunction featuring a defamation on one’s alleged past criminal acts 
wasn’t an interference of freedom of speech and the award to the plaintiff in a British court 
was prescribed by law and was sustained in the boundaries of Article 10 of the ECHR)39 and 
a relatively contemporary entry – Times Newspapers Ltd v. United Kindgdom, where it was 
held that the disclosure of archives in digital media did not constitute a violation of privacy as 
archives are a substantial source for education and historical research40.
2)  a statutory right of a person to demand deletion of personal data stored in a certain record 
system from a person or legal entity maintaining the respective records. The mechanism of the 
31 See. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc (1983), 139 Cal. App. 118, at. 123.
32 See. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. (1961), 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, at. 114–115; footnote 1–2.
33 The primary, and the most cited case of ex-criminal rehabilitation is apparently Melvin v. Reid, where a dictum 
on an ex-criminal’s rehabilitation prevailing over freedom of expression was held (Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 
(Cal. Ct. App., 1931), at. 292). At the same time, a dictum on “right to be forgotten” was held in Briscoe, where the plain-
tiff was to prove his rehabilitation before the trier of fact as well as asserting the severity of the moral damages caused by 
the disclosure of the past facts, see. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association Inc (1971). 4 Cal. 3d 529, at. 541–543. This 
dictum was later used in Conklin, see. Conklin v. Sloss (1978), 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, at. 248. For other “criminal oblivion” 
cases, see generally: Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Corp. (1939) [the plaintiff was not a criminal, but instead fell a victim of a 
robbery and was portrayed in a dramatization]; Milner v. Red River Valley Pub. Co. (1952), Bernstein v. National Broad-
casting Co. (1955); Smith v. National Broadcasting Co. (1957); Barbieri v. Journal Tribune Pub. Co. (1963); Beruan v. 
French (1976); Conklin v. Sloss (1978); Dresbach v. Doubleday (1981); Wasser v. San Diego Union (1987). In a dissenting 
opinion of Judge Bishop in Werner v. Times-Mirror Co (1961), it was proposed that the plaintiff, an ex-attorney, rehabili-
tated himself morally as a lawyer after a bribery scandal and was regarded in the light of an “involuntary public figure”, 
see. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. (1961), 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, at. 123–124.
34 See. FRANKLIN A. M, JOHNSEN D. Epxunging Criminal Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open 
Society, 1981, Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 755–756.
35 See. Beruan v. French (1976), 56 Cal. App. 3d 825, at. 828.
36 For defamation-based recovery based on past facts disclosure, see generally Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Assn. 
(1979); Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers (1987). In Estill v. Hearst (1951), the primary count for defamation regarding past 
events of a 15-year lapse were also held actionable though the invasion of privacy was denied; the same may be attributed 
to the case of Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, where the primary cause of action was also relied on defamation, see for 
detail, Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications (1962), 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, at. 741.
37 See. The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer (1849), S. C. 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110, at. 185–186. In this case, plain-
tiff filed a suit for publishing false statements on him in a newspaper, published in 1830. It was held that as the limitation 
period of libel was six years, the lawsuit was not actionable.
38 Schwabe v. Austria, Application No. 13704/88, Judgment of 28 August 1992, para. 49–53.
39 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, Application No. 18139/91, Judgment of 13 July 1995, para. 36–44, 52–54.
40 Times Newspapers Ltd. (Nos. 1 and 2) v. The United Kingdom, Applications 3002/03 and 23676/03, Judgment of 
10 March 2009, para. 45.
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personal data storage is immaterial41. It arguably derives from the expungement of trial records 
which tolls over a hundred years of history. Kenneth Karst called it “a right to redemption” as 
well as “a right to a fresh start”42. The issue of criminal rehabilitation is well covered in the 
“common law” right to be forgotten, too43. California has enacted legislation which allowed 
to expunge records of “driving under influence” within a decade, but in case the misdemenour 
is repeated within the period of 10 years, the punishment may be even more striking44. A 
1970 US federal law allowed to expunge personal data from consumer reports45. In the 70s, 
the data privacy pioneering expert Alan Westin argued that the maintenance of health records 
involving data on one’s psychiatric deseases and treatment as well as records that belonged 
to the worker’s relatives may cause a substantially adverse impact on their employment46. 
Theoretical concepts of personal data maintenance principles in the 1970s featured notions 
on irrelevant data abolishment47. Being warped into a data protection law, they would be 
imperative norms defining the obligations of a data controller, but not the rights of the data 
subject. At an international level, the problem of data erasure was not sharp until the early 
2010s though international instruments implied norms on data erasure in a fashion similar 
to the one proposed by Ware in the seventies. Finally, a statutory “right to be forgotten” was 
injunct into General Data Protection Regulation of the EU, which is supposed to enter into 
force in Spring 201848. 
3)  a statutory49 or a common law50 right referring to a deletion of personal data held on an Internet 
server, occasionally known as an “erasure button (law)”. Some of them may feature consumer 
information while others may involve data retained on search engines and servers of social 
networks. These are the least regulated out of all three types of “right to be forgotten” and the 
least researched ones. A similar bill with a code name of “SB 568” was passed in California 
which obliges websites to lodge instructions and notifications for minors of removing material 
from the servers51.
It is still obscure to consider a “right to be forgotten” as a separate human right though a number 
of legal scholars argue that it may be somehow respected as such52, but it is highly objectionable 
41 Since the 1970s, the data privacy-related record systems became mainly associated with computer databases. See. 
WESTIN, A. Computers, Health Records and Citizen Rights (NBS Monograph 157), 1976, US Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C., p. 348–349. For the issues of “paper and ink” record systems, see. BLANCHETTE, J. F. & 
JOHNSON D.G. Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 2002, The Information 
Society – An International Journal, Vol. 18 (2002), iss. 1, p. 36–37.
42 KARST, K. “The Files”: Legal Controls Over The Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 1966, Law 
and Contemporary Problems (Duke Law), Vol. 31 (Spring 1966), p. 368–369.
43 See footnote 20 supra.
44 California Vehicle Code, Section 23540 (a).
45 15 U.S.C. Para. 1681c, subsection (a) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) (A); (B).
46 WESTIN, A. Computers, Health Records and Citizen Rights (NBS Monograph 157), 1976, US Government Print-
ing Office, Washington D. C., p. 62–63.
47 WARE, W. Records, Computers and The Rights of Citizens (DHEW Publication No. (OS)73–94), 1973, U.S. De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare, p. 56–57.
48 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with reard to the processing of prsonal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Direc-
tive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation.), 2016, Official Journal of the European Union., Article 17.
49 See. e.g. The New York State Assembly Bill No. A5323, referred internally as “Right to be forgotten act” proposes 
to remove web content on the individual’s demand within 30 days.
50 BENNETT, S. C. The “Right to be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 2012, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 3, Art. 4, p. 163–164.
51 LEE, J. SB 568: Does California’s Online Erasure Button Protect the Privacy of Minors?, 2015, University of 
California, Davis. Zvol. 48:1173, p. 1176.
52 See. BENNETT, S. C. The “Right to be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 2012, Berkeley Journal 
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owing to the vague status of the subject. The common law notion decently lies within the right to 
privacy with a an appendix of “lapse of time” when dealing with the issue of newsworthiness of the 
facts disclosed53; and no specific principles, apart from a “rehabilitation issue” were ever applied to 
separate a conventional interference to privacy54. In the practice of the ECtHR, the Schwabe, Tolstoy 
Miloslavskiy and Times Ltd cases were also decided in the general embrace of right to privacy and 
defamation55. As a statutory right, the “right to be forgotten” provision is engaged into data protection 
laws and codes. The appearing of such issue in EU law also does not transform it into a human right. 
The tapering of right to be forgotten into an entirely “digital” right is also objectionable as it does not 
display the actual scope of the concept. Thus, the “right to be forgotten” is more likely to exist within 
the embrace of the right to privacy as a common law right or a statutory right in data protection laws 
or specific codes of ethics (e.g. maintaining personal data in hospitals, educational institutions or 
industrial enterprises).
 
2. Topicality justification
The Sidis case unleashes a doctrine of a common law “right to be forgotten” concept, which was 
thereafter disposed for dozens of times in suits regarding private information disclosure. The value 
of the “leading” right to be forgotten case is still inestimable as it was cited in hundreds of follow-up 
cases as a precedent as well as launching a broad issue of a so-called “public figure test”56, though 
discussions on an exact normative content of this status were held much earlier57. The Sidis case 
also evoked the issue of newsworthiness estimation which was later developed in the early 1960s. 
Being one of the leading privacy-related cases in the embrace of past event resurrection, the Sidis case 
amalgamated a common law trend “once a public figure – always a public figure” that literally means 
a public figure of voluntary nature is to maintain this status for the entire life.
3. The analysis of current condition in the legal sphere
Although not being anyhow a landmark case, the Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. repeatedly attracted 
the attention of several legal scholars. At first, it became quite resonant within early 1940s 
case comments58, as well as mid 20th century scholars, such as L. R. Yankwich59, W. Prosser60, 
of International Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 3, Art. 4, p. 167. The author refers to a French “droit d’oubli” as a “fundamental hu-
man value”.; WECHSLER, S. The Right to Remember: The European Convention on Human Rights and The Right to be 
Forgotten, 2014, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Vol. 49, Iss. 1, p. 139–140.
53 CASE NOTES: Torts – Invasion of Privacy – Lapse of Time and the Destruction of the Newsworthiness Privilege – 
Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F. 2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962),1964, De Paul Law Review, Vol. 13, iss. 2, article 15, 
p. 325–327.
54 For the dictum, see. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association (1971), 4 Cal. 3d 533, at 542–544. For other issues on 
the “right to be forgotten” and criminal rehabilitation in US common law, see footnote 33.
55 See footnotes 38–40 supra.
56 See. Recent Cases: Torts. Right of Privacy. Public Figure Test as Determinative of Right to Recovery, 1940, The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 8 (1940), Iss. 2, p. 382–383.
57 See e.g. HAND, A. N. Schuyler against Curtis and the right to privacy (1897),The American Law Register and 
Review, Vol. 45 O.S. (36 N.S.) December 1897, No. 12, p. 747–748.
58 See the following: Recent Cases: Torts. Right of Privacy. Public Figure Test as Determinative of Right to Recov-
ery, 1940, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 8 (1940), Iss. 2, p. 382–385; Torts – Right of Privacy – Liability 
or Violating Retirement of Public Figure, 1940, Washington University Law Review, Vol. 26 (January 1940), Iss. 1, 
p. 137–139; Torts. Right of Privacy. Magazine Account of Individual’s Past (1940), Columbia Law Review, Vol. 40, 
No. 7 (Nov., 1940), p. 1283-1285 and CASE NOTES: Torts – Invasion of Privacy – Lapse of Time and the Destruction 
of the Newsworthiness Privilege – Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F. 2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962),1964, De Paul Law 
Review, Vol. 13, iss. 2, article 15, p. 329.
59 YANKWICH, L. R. Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations, 1952, Notre Dame Law Review, 
Vol. 27, Iss. 4, Art. 1, p. 513–514.
60 PROSSER, W. L. Privacy, California Law Review, 1960, Vol. 48, iss. 3, p. 397.
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I. Silver61, R. Posner62, A. Kaminsky63 as well as contemporary researchers, who investigated on 
the issues of right to privacy in case law, right to be forgotten and the issues of privacy for public 
figures, such as J. Whitman64, C. Bennett65 and S. Royston66. Apart from the given article, my aim is 
to systemize the United States common law legacy concerning right to be forgotten to corroborate and 
boost the entire concept as well as broaden its vague margins.
II. The main body
1. Brief overview. The Sidis case as an early right to be forgotten footage and  
other 30s right-to-be-forgotten-related cases: the interest in persons and incidents
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.67 is a case decided by the US Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit 
dealing with an alleged violation of privacy by a story published in an American magazine “New 
Yorker”, which displayed the life of an adolescent genius, William Sidis. In the article, the author 
revealed a multitude of facts as well as some personal data regarding William Sidis, as well as having 
made several assessing statements of his then-current lifestyle which evoked him to file a lawsuit against 
the New Yorker magazine. Particularly this case attracted the attention of several legal researchers. As 
I denoted on the foregoing page, the case was briefly examined in the scope of “right to be forgotten” 
(though not directly named) by various scholars in articles and case comments68. Although upon the 
decision of the Court, William Sidis lost, this case may become a specimen as an early “right to be 
forgotten” footage. Though no specific references to a “right to be forgotten” in the Sidis case existed 
and it fell within the verbatim of alleged privacy violations, it certainly deals with the common law 
right to be forgotten, as the matter of the publication is tangent to remote, past and irrelevant (they 
were such for W. Sidis, I presume) facts from early life of William James Sidis. The Sidis case has got 
several divergencies from several other “right to be forgotten cases”:
1)  First and foremost, the public figure status of the plaintiff in the case of Melvin v. Reid may 
not be compared with William Sidis, although in both types of cases courts would render such 
persons as public figures69. As of the classification of A. Fague, who divided public figures into 
61 SILVER, I. Privacy and the First Amendment, 1966, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4, Art. 1, p. 556–559.
62 POSNER, R. A. Right to Privacy, Georgia Law Review, 1978, Vol. 12, no. 3, p. 415–417.
63 KAMINSKY, A. Defamation Law: Once a Public Figure Always a Public Figure?, 1982, Hosfra law review, 
Vol. 10, iss. 3, article 6, p. 803.
64 WHITMAN, J. Q. The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 2004, Yale Law School; Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper 649, p. 1209–1210.
65 BENNETT, C. The “Right to be Forgotten”: Reconcilling EU and US Perspectives, 2012, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 30, iss. 1, art. 4, p. 170–171.
66 ROYSTON, S. The Right to Be Forgotten: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 2017, St. Mary’s Law 
Journal, Vol. 48:253, p. 267–268.
67 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 112 F. 2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940).
68 See. footnote 47 supra.
69 It is true that a person, willingly or not may become an actor of the event which is of community concern even 
though this event might be thanatoid. As outlined in Jones v. Herald Post Co.: “There are times, however, when one, 
whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest. When this takes place, he 
emerges from his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy to publish his photograph with an account of 
such occurrence” (see in detail, Jones v. Herald Post Co. 230 Ky. 227 (Ky. Ct. App, 1929), at. 229). People plunged into 
certain events as casualties, loss a part of their privacy: One who unwillingly comes into the public eye as in the case of 
a criminal and even one unjustly charged with crime or the subject of a striking catastrophe, is subject to limitations of 
the right to be let alone (Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super 528 (1959), at. 533, citing the Restatement of Torts, Vol. 4, 
para. 867, at. 400–401) For similar instances, see generally the following cases: Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner (1939), 
Themo v. New England Insurance Co. (1940) Kelley v. Post Publishing Co. (1951); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co. 
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“voluntary” and “involuntary”70, plaintiff in Melvin had received an involuntary publicity and 
her privacy was no way invaded by news reports, or a telecast featuring her true name, story 
and activities, but a film with usage of her personal data and her life story. Being not actionable 
in the state of California, it was ruled on basis of an unwarranted intrusion into one’s private 
life71. Following the public figure achievement subdevision in the Werner v. Times-Mirror 
Co, a person can achieve this status either by his acts or by circumstances72. The incidents 
of the plaintiff’s unsavory past in Melvin case became public owing to their subsistence in 
public records73 whereas William Sidis amalgamated his publicity by his uncommon mental 
abilities. From my point of view, the idea of rehabilitation in society must be tied not with 
W. Sidis case at all: the case of Briscoe. will fit it at its best74, where the dictum of an ex-
criminal rehabilitation was observed by the court. However, the Briscoe case did not grant 
the right to be forgotten: although the court expressed a dictum upon which a conjectural jury 
would incline to decide in favor of plaintiff75, the judgement was reversed and remanded to the 
trial court76, the plaintiff was to prove his rehabilitation to the trier of fact as well as ascertain 
malice of the publication77. The case of Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc., an early “right to be 
forgotten” case is akin to Melvin v. Reid: the plaintiff, previously a chaffeur, filed a suit againt 
a broadcasting company for unauthorized dramatization of the incident he was plunged into in 
a relatively recent past, when he suffered a gunshot wound within a robbery; the reminder of 
(1951); Abernathy v. Thornton (1955); Waters v. Fleetwood (1956), Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Co. (1956); Jenkins v. 
Dell Publishing Company (1956); Wagner v. Fawcett Publications (1962); Time Inc. v. Hill (1967); Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn (1973).
70 FAGUE, A. C. Right to privacy in California, Santa Clara Law Review, 1967, Vol. 7, no. 2 article 5, p. 253–254. 
In fact In fact, this idea was coined earlier in a 1941 comment on a so-called “public figure test” in Chicago University 
Law Review (See. Torts. Right to Privacy. Public Figure Test as Determinative of Right to Recovery (1941), The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 8 No. 2 (Feb. 1941), p. 382–383). Upon the foregoing article, involuntary public 
figures are to have a greater amount of privacy remained. It was argued that in case an involuntary public figure does not 
“capitalize” from the fact of obtaining some publicity, this person may have the priviledge and escaping public attention 
in any concern except from the situation that made him public. In the 1970s and early 1980s, involuntary public figures 
were designated by several legal scholars as “limited-size public figures” whereas the ones entitled as “voluntary” were 
referred as “all-purpose public figures”. Albeit courts rarely disposed these terms directly, Kaminsky hinted that Gertz 
v. Robert Welch Inc. made a stringent distinction between them (see. KAMINSKY, A. Defamation Law: Once a Public 
Figure Always a Public Figure? 1982, Hosfra law review, Vol. 10, iss. 3, article 6, p. 809). As the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated in the Gertz case, “In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes 
a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn 
into a particular public controversy, and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case, such 
persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions” (see. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974), at. 351).
71 In fact, there was no such statute in the law of California and it is apparent that if such statute exists in the State 
of New York, it is not applicable in another jurisdiction, see Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp (1951), 108 Cal. App. 2d 
191 at. 197. In this case, the Court cited the Melvin case, where the Court directly stressed that the “use of the incidents 
from the life of appellant in the moving picture is in itself not actionable” (Melvin v. Reid. 112 Cal. App 285 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1931), at. 291).
72 See. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. (1961), 193 Cal. App. 2d, at. 117. “A person may, by his own activities or by the 
force of circumstances, become a public personage and thereby relinquish a part of his right of privacy to the extent that 
the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or character”.
73 Melvin v. Reid. 112 Cal. App 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931), at. 291.
74 Although, the issue of criminal rehabilitation was decently covered in Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co. and 
Barbieri v. News Journal Co., the primary dictum on felon oblivion was featured explicitly in Briscoe.
75 Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association Inc. 4 Cal. 3d 529, at. 541–542.
76 Here the court referred to the Liberty Lobby Inc. v. Pearson (1968) case, see. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Assiocia-
tion Inc. 4 Cal. 3d 533 at 542.
77 Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529 at. 543.
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the incident caused the plaintiff deep stress, soon he felt unable to work as a driver that brought 
to his subsequent job loss78. The court ruled in favor of plaintiff, but not on foundations of a 
civil statute prohibiting the use of one’s likeness or name: Melvin was hallmarked as a direct 
precedent in the Mau case, consequently, the plaintiff won on grounds of unwarranted privacy 
invasion.
2)  The second point of disparity is that the plaintiff in the Sidis case did not require to be 
rehabilitated in society from anything obscene: the unsavory past of the plaintiffs in the 
Melvin and Briscoe cases is apparent and I personally can not say Sidis’s youth may have been 
considered as impious. In my humble opinion the adolescent facts of Mr. Sidis’s youth might 
have not stimulated an adverse impact on his mature life. Though, according to the publication 
concerned, the plaintiff had an alternate vision. So, let us proceed to the case.
1.2. The first suit
Filing the first suit, Sidis stated two causes of action – one count for a violation of a common law right 
to privacy (which, as of 1938 was recognized in five US states79) and another for an alleged violation 
of New York Civil Rights Law, §50–5180. Sidis also appended his claim by the fact that the article 
about him was announced in the New York World Telegram with the following liner notes: “Out To-
Day. Harvard Prodigy. Biography of the Man Who Astonished Harvard at the Age of Eleven. Where 
Are They Now? By J. L. Manley, p. 22, The New Yorker”81. Before examining the existing cases 
that recognized the right to privacy, Judge Goddard stated that there were no decisions abolishing 
truthful press publications regarding somebody’s life events: “<…> no decision of the courts in 
these states has been cited by counsel, nor have I found any which held the “right of privacy” to be 
violated by a newspaper or magazine publishing a correct account of one’s life or doings, or a picture, 
except under abnormal circumstances which do not exist in the case at bar”82. The majority of the 
cited cases dealt primarily with unauthorized employment of one’s pictures or names/surnames for 
making commercial products. After having analyzed the 11 cases, the Court held that the allegations 
of Sidis regarding a privacy infringement didn’t state a cause of action and the count was thereupon 
dismissed83. As mentioned before, in the second count, Sidis blamed the newspaper for using his name 
within advertising the article about him and sought exemplary damages. Within filing the second cause 
of action, Sidis relied on the case of Binns v. Vitagraph Co., where a portrayal of a ship wreck was 
dramatized with disposing the name and the picture of the plaintiff; the Court stated that the Binns 
case featured a classic privacy violation that fell under the provisions Sidis referred to. The Court 
represented a demarcation between the provisions of the New York Civil Rights Law and a paper 
publication featuring someone’s photographs and other personal data as follows: “It is plain that there 
is a wide difference between such forbidden use of one’s name and picture and the mere publication in 
a newspaper or magazine of an account of one’s deeds or doings together with his picture”84. A more 
detailed elucidation of such a distinction was held in the 1940 judgement as Sidis repeated the first two 
78 Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc., 28 F Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939), at. 845–846.
79 The following cases were observed by the Court: Georgia: Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. (1905), 
Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital (1930); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al. v. Vandergriff (1936); Kansas: Kunz v. Allen 
(1918); Kentucky: Foster-Milburn v. Chinn (1909), Douglas v. Stokes (1912); Brents v. Morgan (1927); Jones v. Herald 
Post Company (1927); Rhodes v. Graham (1931); California: Melvin v. Reid (1931); Missouri: Munden v. Harris (1911).
80 Sidis v. FR Pub. Corporation, 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), at. 20.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., at. 21.
83 Ibid., at. 22.
84 Ibid., at. 25.
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causes of action in his second suit85. The Court held that the unauthorized employment of one’s name 
or picture for commercial purposes under the law of five (as of 1938) states was illicit being a common 
law right to privacy violation. The state of New York, instead, did not recognize a common law right 
to privacy – such violation was prescribed by a statute. As the Court held, in the aforementioned cases 
there were no decisions which showed that a newspaper or a magazine article that displayed someone’s 
photographs or names and truthful information regarding people is a violation of privacy86. So, the 
Court dismissed both causes of actions and Sidis lost the primary suit.
It is also noteworthy that the first Sidis case decided by the district court, did not feature an 
extended discussion on the public concern regarding William Sidis in sharp contrast with the opinion 
in the 1940 judgement. The solitary case involving a public interest test cited by the Court within the 
opinion was Jones v. Herald Post Publishing Co. In this case, the plaintiff, a wife of a man slayed 
before her eyes on the street, filed a suit against the newspaper who published her photograph and 
her menacing quotations addressed to the murderers as well as the fact she had attacked one of the 
villains87. The Court found that no violation of privacy occurred in Jones case and stated that “There 
are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public 
or general interest. When this takes place, he emerges from his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of 
his right of privacy to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence”88.
 
2. The history of William James Sidis
William James Sidis (1898 – 1944) was an American mathematician and by far the youngest child 
prodigy ever recorded. Sidis sued the “New Yorker” for the article “Where Are They Now? April 
Fool!”, released on August 14, 1937 that was written by Jared Manley and James Thurber89. So let us 
examine the article for which the plaintiff filed the suit. I have to denote that all information regarding 
the early life of Sidis is outtaken from the original article. So, William James Sidis was born on April 1, 
1898 in New York in the family of emigrant scholars descending from Ukraine90. His father Boris Sidis 
(1868 – 1923), who was born in Kyiv, emigrated to the US and graduated from Harvard University, 
was a psychiatrician (PhD) and engaged his son into science from his very birth: at age two, William 
managed to read and write. Within a year, he learned English and French; at age five William wrote 
a paper on anatomy and conducted rather complexified arithmetic calculations; the achievement of 
the infant genius were described by his father Boris in a number of scientific articles, including a 
book “Philistine and Genius” (1911)91. After William overrun a six-year school program in half a 
year, his father tempted to enrol the 9-year-old William into Harvard Univesity, but his effort was 
primordially retarded owing to the age of his son92. In 1909, William was allowed to immaticulate into 
Harvard as a full-pledged freshman, becoming the youngest recorded Harvard student93. He apparently 
became prominent, but could not endure his notoriety for a long time and soonly departed to his 
father’s sanatorium to regain his depleted forces. After he had returned to Harvard, Sidis developed 
shyness, phobias and distrust to other people and repeatedly omited the press94 William’s adherence to 
85 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940), at. 810.
86 Sidis v. FR Pub. Corporation, 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), at. 25.
87 Jones v. Herald Post Company 230 Ky. 227 (Ky. Ct. App, 1929), at. 227–228.
88 Ibid., at. 229.
89 THE NEW YORKER (by J. Manley and J. Thurber): Where Are They Now? April Fool!, Aug. 14, 1937, p. 22–26. 
Link < http://www.sidis.net/newyorker3.htm>.
90 Ibid., p. 22.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 23.
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seclusion has hallmarked in an adolescent age: W. Sidis reportedly claimed to have dogded welters95, 
and he vowed to take up celibacy at the age of 1796. In the interview on his graduation day, William 
Sidis claimed he would thereafter prefer to conduct “a perfect life”. In the interpretation of Sidis, 
oblivion was the best way to fulfill it: “The only way to live the perfect life is to live it in seclusion. 
I have always hated crowds” – he said97. The reporter came to an corollary that by employing the 
word “crowds” W. Sidis thereby implied “people” in general. Over the next years, the press turmoil 
around W. Sidis ceased. As Sidis became a mature man, he entered Harward Law School and was not 
disturbed by reporters, but he occasionally found himself in the center of interest, that was apparently 
annoying for him98. In 1919 Sidis was plunge into a largely-displayed scandal, when he participated in a 
Communist demonstration that lasted in Roxbury on May 1, 1919, which transmuted into a riot. Within 
the demonstration, Sidis carried a Communist flag and got busted as one of the meeting instigators99. 
Sidis was reported to be audacious within his trial, too: Sidis approved his Socialist views, claimed 
he had been an atheist, upheld the Soviet Union form of government and jeered at the interrogation of 
why he did not carry an American flag instead of a Communist one by unfolding a miniature United 
States flag out of his pocket in the courtroom and stating he had carried it on the meeting as well100. 
Though Sidis was sentenced to a 18-month inprisonment for provoking a riot, his father bailed him and 
later put Sidis into a sanatorium where he underwent treatment. Since then, William Sidis abandoned 
any publicity, moving from town to town and taking up conventional office jobs, quitting occupied 
positions after having been unveiled by other people (in the conclusive part of the passage, Sidis told 
in an interview he had to leave jobs when employers or colleagues found out who Sidis used to be 
in his youth)101. Through the 1920s, reporters repeatedly approached Sidis. In 1926, Sidis wrote a 
book regarding the optimization of streetcar and other railroad transportation under a pseudonym of 
Frank Folupa: after cunning reporters unveiled it was him, William subsequently found himself in the 
center of attention102. By 1927, Sidis returned to New York, where he lived with his sister and made 
friends with a man named Harry Friedman, his landlord and spent his time discussing his hobby in 
collecting transfer tickets103. I have to outline, that at this point, the article’s author unveiled a handful 
of personal data regarding Sidis’s then-current life: namely, the authors mentioned the address of his 
domicile (112, West 119th Street), as well as the initials of his relative. Until 1937 Sidis was likely to 
live unobstrusively in the way he had preferred before.
Displaying the life of Sidis at age 39 (as of 1937), Manley stated that then-contemporary Sidis 
resided in Boston (“in a hall bedroom of Boston’s shabby south end”) and gave details of the interior 
of his dwelling, overally depicting it as a sloven one104. He also described the appearance of Sidis, who 
turned out to be “a large, heavy man, with a prominent jaw, a thickish neck and a reddish moustache”105, 
as well as his manner of speech, gestures and a so-designated “gasping laugh”. Manley, who made 
this corollary on grounds of a recent interview with Sidis, assessed his lifestyle as underwritten: “He 
seems to get a great enjoyment of leading a life of wandering irresponsibility after a childhood of 
95 Ibid.
96 THE WASHINGTON POST: “Harvard‘s Prodigy at Figures, Aged 17, Takes Vow of Celibacy”, April 18, 1915.
97 THE NEW YORKER (by J. Manley and J. Thurber): Where Are They Now? April Fool!, Aug. 14, 1937, p. 23 Link 
<http://www.sidis.net/newyorker3.htm>.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 25–26.
102 Ibid., p. 24–25.
103 Ibid., p. 24.
104 Ibid., p. 25–26.
105 Ibid., p. 26.
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scurpulous regimentation”106. The last part of the New Yorker article revealed that Sidis confessed 
to have dispose a simple piece of red silk to substitute a Soviet flag in the demonstration in 1919107 
Sidis also affirmed his interests in Socialist theories as well as disclosing the fact he was working on 
a treatise concerning floods. This is all concerning the content of the given article, with a remark: the 
primary page contained a sketch of an 11-year-old Sidis conducting a lecture for senior researchers on 
four-dimensional bodies108.
3. Opinion of the Court
William Sidis stated three causes of action of such alleged violations:
–  an overall intrusion of privacy, malice of the publication;
–  a breach of New York Civil Rights Law (para. 50–51)109;
–  a libel which allegedly existed in the article “Where Are They Now? April Fool!”110.
3.1. Opinion of the Court regarding the first cause of action
3.1.1. An issue of public figures
The first cause of action was an alleged violation of privacy. I have to outline that the Court examined 
a number of cases which were principal ones evolving a common law right to privacy in several US 
states (Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri111 – as of 1940) and a constitutional right (“<…> to 
be let alone to a certain extent”) in California, recognized in Melvin v. Reid112. The Court outlined, that 
after having examined the principal cases of other states, there were no rulings that averted a newspaper 
from publishing truth about a person even though certain life-secluded details were unfolded, quoting 
literally “None of the cited rulings goes so far as to prevent a newspaper or magazine from publishing 
the truth about a person, however intimate, revealing, or harmful the truth may be”. At the same time, 
the Court hallmarked that priviledges for the press were also not granted in the principal cases. To solve 
the contraversion, the Court reckoned up a handful of protogene concepts elaborated by Warren and 
Brandeis in 1890113, however the considerations of the court dispersed from their notions114. At first, 
the Court referred to their treatise, where the scholars expressed the notion that a bunch of limitations 
regarding press priviledges still are to exist. In the scope of privacy and public interest collision, 
as of Warren and Brandeis, public figures are to relinquish a substantial part of their privacy as an 
atonement for the powers they obtain within their tenure115. At the same time, the abovementioned 
106 Ibid., p. 25–26.
107 Sidis on the 1919 demonstration: “I was the flag-bearer. And do you know what the flag was? Just a piece of red 
silk” (outtake from the New Yorker: “Where are they now? April fool!”, p. 26).
108 THE NEW YORKER (by J. Manley and J. Thurber): Where Are They Now? April Fool!, Aug. 14, 1937, p. 22 
Link < http://www.sidis.net/newyorker3.htm>.
109 Within his second suit, Sidis filed a suit on grounds of citizenship diversity, announced in Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins by the US Supreme Court. It would allow to recover under the law of each state where the publication with the story 
of Sidis occurred. See. Torts – Right of Privacy – Liability or Violating Retirement of Public Figure, 1940, Washington 
University Law Review, Vol. 26 (January 1940), Iss. 1, p. 137.
110 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806, at. 807.
111 This figure was apparently virtual for 1940. In Briscoe, the Supreme Court of California mentioned that the com-
mon law recognition of privacy by 1971 encompassed at least 36 US states, see. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association 
Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 533, at 534.
112 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806., at. 808.
113 Ibid., at. 808–809.
114 Ibid., at. 809.
115 Ibid.
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scholars considered that public figures must preserve privacy to a certain extent – that is, for their 
private affairs which do not expose issues on their eligibility to sustain the position of an official. The 
Court stressed that in such an interpretation Sidis’s privacy might have been invaded, as in 1940, he 
wasn’t public in general: “Sidis today is neither politician, public administrator, nor statesman”116. 
However, the Court did not adher to the priorly depicted notion: despite the opinion given by 
Warren and Brandeis, the Court stated: “we are not yet disposed to afford to all of the intimate details 
of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the press”, augmenting that Warren and 
Brandeis predominantly focused this concept on public officers. The Court ruled that some trespassing 
into private life of a person that achieved the status of a “public figure” is eligible117 (it is concordant 
to outline that the status of “public figure” is a pretty vague substance). The Court stated that William 
Sidis apparently was once a public figure (though it occured in his adolescent time, around 1910), the 
interest of the press was entirely legitimate even though the young Sidis, as in his later years, repulsed 
public attention118. The Court augmented, that the interest to William Sidis was licit in the succeeding 
years either: whether Sidis had fulfilled the expectations entrusted to him in his youth or not remained 
a matter of public concern, concluded the Court119. A few pages above I briefly touched the issue of 
public interest test in the Sidis case in comparison with the one in Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner case. 
So now, let us discuss it in details. The public interest test applied in the first cause of action in the 
Sidis case was as follows: in general, disclosures of intimate details may be quite offensive. However, 
in terms of public characters, truthfull statements on their dressing, speech and habits “will usually not 
transgress this line”. The Court augmented that “<…> Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties 
of neighbors and “public figures” are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the 
population”. As such public interest constituted one of the mores of community, the Court ruled that it 
would be unwise to bar such expressions of mass-media120.
3.1.2. (Not) transgressing the line?
Next, what assumptions are to be said concerning “will usually not transgress this line”? Such statement 
hints this line does exist. If we return to the foregoing page, the court outlined that “Revelations may 
be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s 
notions of decency”121. The problem here is to define the margins of the line that may result in the 
plaintiff’s prevail in the action against the publisher. The protogene balancing boundaries, examined 
through the prism of Warren and Brandeis’ treatise122 were not issued in the Sidis case or anyhow 
defined. The question how offensive a publication may be, was frequently observed by US courts but a 
definite stand was never announced. As summarized by the US Supreme Court in Time v. Hill, although 
newsworthy and truthful news are generally priviledged, it does not deprive a person on preserving 
some degree of privacy, citing the Sidis court’s quotation on outraging the norms of public decency123. 
As Kalven denoted in his treatise “Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?”: “<…> It 
has been agreed that there is a generous privilege to serve the public interest in news. And today, since 
116 Ibid.
117 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806, at. 809, quoting: “We would go further, though we are not yet prepared 
to say how far. At least we would permit limited scrutiny of the “private” life of any person who has achieved, or has had 
thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable status of a “public figure”.
118 Ibid., at. 809.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., at. 808–809.
123 Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1964), footnote 7.
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New York Time Co. v. Sullivan, the privilege may arguably have some constitutional status. What is an 
issue, it seems to me, is whether a claim of privilege is not so overpowering as virtually to swallow the 
tort. What can be left of the vaunted new right after the claims of privilege have been confronted?”124. 
At the same time, a publication of anything offensive to privacy is not actionable itself, as quoted in 
Wasser v. San Diego Union: “<…> The supreme mandate of the constitutional protection of freedom 
of the press provides that even a tortious invasion of privacy is exempt from lability if the publication 
of private facts is truthful and newsworthy”125. We can additionally cite Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 
“Many things which are distressing or may be lacking in propriety or good taste are not actionable”126. 
An akin assumption was made in the case of Waters v. Fleetwood127. In Abernathy v. Thornton, plaintiff 
was a woman whose son was murdered by a gunshot; a story regarding the murder was issued in a 
newspaper and a photograph of the deceased man featured a bullet protruding from his head128. The 
Court found that no privacy violation occured, as the murdered man, who was the plaintiff’s son, by 
fact became a public character as the circumstances of his tragic death were of public concern129. In 
Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Publishing Company, a dreadful incident occurred concerning an 8-year-
old boy, who disappeared for a month; his body was discovered mutilated. The photo of the child’s 
body was published in the article concerning his death130. The plaintiffs, who were the parents of the 
deceased child admitted the overall story was of legitimate public interest argued that the exposure of 
the body which was partially decomposed had no public concern regarding the condition of the dead 
body – that is, it the proposed notion was “proportionality” proposed by plaintiffs – such an incident, as 
the accident which brought to his death apparently can not be barred from publication, but a portrayal 
of the body may be deemed too offensive to be issued freely. Such balance could also be found in the 
elucidation of Georgia’s rape shield law: as stated by Justice Gunter in the Georgia’s Supreme Court 
decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v Cohn: “This statute does not prevent disclosure or publication of 
“the event” [a rape], it merely prohibits the disclosure or publication of the identity of the victim of the 
event”131. However, the Court withdrew such “balance” grounding the conclusion on basis of general 
interest of public in a local victim’s appearance132. In the case of Waters v. Fleetwood, a suit was filed 
for publishing a photo of a murdered girl photographed from the back wrapped in covering assortment 
and chains, but was unidentifiable in contrast to the Bremmer case133. In a later case, Diaz v. Oakland 
Tribune Inc., a transsexual being a public figure sued the newspaper for referring to her as such, won 
the suit on grounds the court found that such disclosure wasn’t newsworthy; at the same time, the 
Court hallmarked that highly offensive revelations do not constitute a privacy invasion themselves in 
case they’re proved to be newsworthy: “The proof that defendants have published an article containing 
highly offensive private matters does not itself establish a claim for relief. It certainly must be recognized 
124 KALVEN, H. Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 1966, Law and Contemporary Problems 
(Duke Law), Vol. 31 (Spring 1966), p. 335–336.
125 Wasser v. San Diego Union (1987), 191 Cal. App. 3d 1455, at. 1461.
126 Kelley v. Post Publishing Co. (1951), 327 Mass. 275, at. 278.
127 Waters v. Fleetwood (1956), 91 S. E.2d 344, 212 Ga. 161, at. 167, quotation: “There are many instances of grief 
and human suffering which the law can not redress. The present case is one of those instances. Through no fault of the 
petitioner or her deceased child, they became the objects of widespread public interest”.
128 Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235 (1955), at. 235–236.
129 Ibid., at. 237.
130 Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Publishing Company, 76 N.W. 2d 762 (1956), at. 763.
131 Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (1973), at. 68.
132 Ibid., at. 768.
133 Waters v. Fleetwood (1956), 91 S. E. 2d 344, 212 Ga. 161, at. 167; see also. Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Publishing 
Company, 76 N.W. 2d 762 (1956), at. 768.
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that an otherwise embarrassing article may be newsworthy, depending on the circumstances”134. 
Criminals were also regarded as ones whose past unsavory story may be newsworthy and educational 
enough to be published135 and owing to the fact the community has a strong interest towards law 
enforcement, involving tracking down deliquency136. Apart from being treated as public figures, ex-
criminals were not granted a right to be forgotten even though they claimed to have been rehabilitated 
after serving an unusual punishment137, serving a 9-year incarceration138, aquitted139, having lived as 
a virtuous citizen for 11 years after committing a hijack (reversed and remanded)140, having lived for 
20 years after having committed a murder and being rehabilitated as a law-abiding citizen (reversed 
and remanded)141 or even being dead by the time of trial in a so-called “relational right to privacy 
suit”142. There are still some cases, though, which display that “decencies” still exist. Yes, such cases 
as Barber v. Time and Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital where the photographs featured more, so-to-say 
“intimate” details of one’s affairs, namely, a woman with an orphane pancrea disease in the former 
case, and a body of a malformed child in the latter143. In his respective treatise, Charles Simon referred 
to the two abovegiven cases as the ones that “violate ordinary decencies”144. In the case of Barber v. 
Time, the plaintiff was a woman who suffered from an orphane pancrea pathology that forced her to 
encounter permanent hunger. She sued the newspaper for unveiling the details of her impairment as 
well as a photograph of her in a hospital outfit145 and the court found a privacy violation; the Bazemore 
case featured a photograph of a malformed child who died soonly after birth and the Court found that 
the action under such circumstances may lie in the parents of the deceased infant146. Another issue 
is a portrayal of an embarassing pose. In sharp contrast with Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. and Gill v. 
Heart Publishing Co., the case of Daily Times Democrat v. Graham featured an unauthorized photo of 
a 44-year-old woman in an embarassing posture with her skirt blown upwards by the flow of air jets147 
and a recovery was also granted to her.
In “Privacy”, Prosser strived to grasp the conjectural boundaries148 and a few cases featuring 
them really occurred. In an unreported case, namely the Douglas v. Disney Productions (1956), a 
Los Angeles trial court held that Kirk Douglas (born 1916), a famous actor, who was engaged in a 
merriment in his comrade’s appartment, which was filmed on a camera and was later used for public 
showing149, to have a cause of action. Prosser also briefly commented on the Melvin case, where the 
134 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. (1983), 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, at. 130.
135 Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971), 4 Cal. 3d 529, at. 538.
136 Ibid.
137 Barbieri v. News Journal Co., 189 A. 2d 773 (1963), at. 775.
138 Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), at. 818–819.
139 See. Wasser v. San Diego Union (1987), 191 Cal. App. 3d 1455, at. 1459.
140 See. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971), 4 Cal. 3d 529, at. 532–533.
141 See. Conklin v. Sloss (1978), 86 Cal. App. 3d 242, at. 243.
142 See. Milner v. Red River Valley Pub. Co. 249 S. W. 2d 227 (1952), at. 228.
143 See. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 (Ga. 1930), at. 257–258; is a very dubious Georgian case as it 
recognized the right to relational privacy with no other interests abused. The opinion was not unanimous and in a strict 
sense Bazemore did not have a direct successor case. There are more comments on the public interest in people plunged 
into casualties in this paper and the Bazemore case is briefly discussed within certain comparisons. But in general it 
requires a separate treatise.
144 SIMON, C. Torts – Invasion of Privacy – Unauthorized Use of Photograph (1966), DePaul Law Review, Vol. 16, 
iss. 1 (Fall – Winter 1966), Article 22, p. 256–257.
145 Barber v. Time, 348 Mo. 1199 (Mo. 1942), at. 1203–1204.
146 Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 (Ga. 1930), at. 262.
147 Daily Times Democrat v. Graham 162 So. 2d 474 (1964), at. 476.
148 PROSSER, W. L., Privacy, California Law Review, 1960, Vol. 48, iss. 3, p. 397, p. 417–419.
149 FAGUE, A. C. Right to privacy in California, Santa Clara Law Review, 1967, Vol. 7, no. 2 article 5, p. 250.
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scholar surmised one of reasons for the plaintiffs prevailing in her action was precisely the shocking 
content of the revelation: “<…> or perhaps that the explanation lay in the shocking enormity of the 
revelation of a woman’s past when she was trying to lead a decent life”150. Another “boundary” 
described by Prosser was an existence of statutes in a number of US states which inhibited the 
disclosure of sex-crimes victims151. Actually, the statutes Prosser referred to in his treatise are called 
“rape-shield laws”, they may differ in various states and impose liability on publishing the identities 
of sex crime sacrifices. However, a Georgian statute imposing civil liability on media for publishing a 
rape victim’s identity was invalidated by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn (1975) where the Court on grounds of the First and Fourteenth Amendments barred the State 
of Georgia from “making appelants’ broadcast the basis of civil liability”152.Therefore, the boundaries 
of what the US Court of Appeals of the 2nd Circuit called “will not usually transgress this line” in the 
Sidis case are quite vague. 
3.1.3. A public interest test: never to be forgotten
So, the principal public interest test concerning a public personage’s private life ever decided in United 
States common law153 and employed by the US Court of Appeals of the 2nd Circuit goes as follows:
1.  The grades of privacy in the cases of private and public persons considerably vary as owing 
to their status and any types of public figures are to sacrifice their privacy. The same applies 
to private citizens who are spotted in public places: the case of Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. 
(1953) unleashes this pattern at its best; this is also relevant for the people spotted within 
unique events154. In the Gill case, the plaintiffs (a husband and a wife) sued the newspaper 
for publishing an unauthorized picture of them sitting in a restaurant hugging. Although the 
court found that no news value subsisted in the picture it held that it contained an entertaining 
purpose and thus had legitimate public interest155. As the picture was taken in a public place 
(it was a worldwide-famous restaurant) and the couple voluntarily exhibited themselves in an 
affectionate pose, the court employed the doctrinal principle introduced in Melvin v. Reid: there 
can be no privacy in that which is already public156. In the Gill v Hearst Publishing Co. (1953), 
a dissenting opinion was conveyed by Judge Carter, who broght the following view regarding 
defining a private citizen’s right to privacy in scope of publishing such materials by the press: 
“courts should consider the effect of such publication upon the sensibility of the ordinary 
private citizen, and not upon the sensibility of those persons who seek and enjoy publicity157 
and notoriety and seeing their pictures on public display, or those who are in the „public eye“ 
such as public officials, clergymen, lecturers, actors and others whose professional careers 
bring them in constant contact with the public and in whom the public or some segment thereof 
150 PROSSER, W. L. Privacy, California Law Review, 1960, Vol. 48, iss. 3, p. 397, p. 419.
151 Ibid, p. 417.
152 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975), at. 497.
153 WHITMAN, J. Q. The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty (2004), Yale Law School; Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper 649, p. 1209–1210.
154 Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971), 4 Cal. 3d 529, at. 538.
155 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. 40 Cal. 2nd 224 (1953), at. 229.
156 Ibid, at. 230.
157 I also would like to hallmark that a person seeking publicity is equalled to a public personage in US common law. 
See Cohen v. Marx 94 (1949) Cal. App. 2nd 704 at 705: “A person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of life, or 
by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or character, is said 
to become a public personage, and thereby relinquishes a part of his right of privacy”.
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is interested”158. As for an equipoise, in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham the Court held that 
although the scene may be public, it does not necessarily mean that the person concerned will 
relinquish all his privacy: “One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed 
as an incidental part of that scene in his ordinary status. Where the status he expects to occupy 
is changed without his volition to a status embarrassing to an ordinary person of reasonable 
sensitivity, then he should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to be protected from an 
indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right of privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him 
in a public place”159. That is, the principle amalgamated in Melvin v. Reid, “there is no privacy 
in what is already public” is confined to a matter of decency. At the same time, the right to 
privacy in public also can not go out of strict boundaries as it will definitely abuse the freedom 
of press: as it was hallmarked in Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Company, “The 
counts in question stated no case unless the plaintiffs under all conceivable circumstances had 
an absolute legal right to exclude from a newspaper any photograph of them taken without their 
permission. If every person has such a right, no newspaper could lawfully publish a photograph 
of a parade or a street scene”160.
2.  The publicity is likely to remain for the whole life of a once-public character. It is actually the 
Sidis case which established this principle. Two decades after, William Prosser also turned to 
some issues of “right to be forgotten” in his treatise “Privacy” (1960)161. As he denoted, the 
function of press regarding its educational role, as well as a reminder of past events and people 
and events that were notorious at some time in the past may be a matter of the public interest 
at present time. Prosser also briefly discussed an issue of a lapse of time in the embrace of 
which the plaintiff disappeared from the attention of public. After all, he concluded that once 
an individual became a public personage, the interest in him would sustain until his demise162. 
Not being stringently announced, this rule seemed to have been accommodated: in Stryker 
v. Republic Pictures Corp., where the plaintiff, an ex-serviceman sued the establishment for 
an alleged commercial use of his name and life story in a film named “The Sands of Iwo 
Jima”, the Court found him a public figure tating that the activities of military men are under 
public scrutiny and one’s discharge from the army does may not bar a publication of them163. 
Although William Sidis was once a public figure, the court neither defined lapses of publicity 
fade nor defined any boundaries of being a public figure or an issue of the subsistence of ex-
public figures. In “Privacy”, W. Prosser argued, that a voluntary public figure, or plainly public 
figure is generally a celebrity in one field of affairs, or another164. The embrace of voluntary 
public figures is complicated to define explicitly, a great summary definition was given in 
Cason v. Baskin: “It is true that a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, 
or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, 
his affairs and his character, may be said to have become a public personage and to that extent 
he thereby relinquishes at least a part of his right of privacy”165. Prosser made an attempt to 
classify the voluntary public figures on basis of existing common law: among public officials, 
actors, musicians, sportsmen, entertainers, public officers and servicemen as well as inventors 
158 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. 40 Cal. 2nd 224 (1953), at. 234.
159 Ibid., at. 478.
160 Themo v. New England Publishing Company (1940), 306 Mass. 54, at. 57.
161 PROSSER, W. L. Privacy, California Law Review, 1960, Vol. 48, iss. 3, p. 418.
162 Ibid.
163 Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp. (1951), 108 Cal App. 2d 191, at. 194.
164 PROSSER, W. Privacy (1960), California Law Review, Vol. 48 (August 1960), Iss. 3, Art. 1, p. 410–411.
165 Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31 (Fla. 1947), at. 36.
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fell into such a category166. Upon the assumptions in the Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. case, 
it would be logical to conclude a corollary that people working in the sphere of education and 
religion are also to be treated in this category167.
3.  The article was newsworthy. No actual standards for newsworthiness were anyhow established 
though168, the article regarding Sidis was considered as a newsworthy one owing to the fact 
it depicted an unusual personality. The Court also emphasized that the newsworthiness does 
not constitute a complete defence169. The newsworthiness issue in the Sidis case was also 
overviewed in a 1963 comment release published in Chicago Law Review, where the authors 
philosophically interrogate if the priviledge of newsworthiness is “qualified”, or not170. If it 
is, then where’s the measuring line? Conjecturally, a certain lapse of time would be one. An 
exception nearly occurred in the case of Wagner v. Fawcett Publications (1962), where the 
plaintiff, a mother of a raped and slain 14-year-old lass filed a suit for privacy invasion. After 
the complaint was dismissed by a district court, the plaintiff appealed to the US Court of 
Appeals171. The U.S. Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit stated that a jury would consider that the 
abovementioned events ceased to be news and henceforth might constitute a privacy violation; 
the lapse of the occurences tolled several months172. This ruling, however was withdrawn on 
the re-hearing173, and the judgement of the district court was thereafter affirmed174. In Werner, 
a dissenting opinion of Judge Bishop hinted that the marriage of the plaintiff which we would 
prefer to seal still was “news”, but his early career scandals and exploits were off the point175.
3.1.4. No privacy infringement – no malice
Retracing to the concluding fragmenton for the first cause of action, the alleged malice of the “New 
Yorker” publication, which was withdrawn by the Court either. As the Court ruled that the publication 
did not invade Sidis’s privacy, the presumed subsistence of any malice would not sequence an 
alteration in the outcome of the article: “If plaintiff’s right of privacy was not invaded by the article, 
the existence of actual malice in its publication would not change that result”176. A true publication 
will not become a libel unless provided by statute and the same principle is to be applicable regarding 
privacy177. It is concordant to outline that the notion of explicit truthfullness of the publication became 
166 PROSSER, W. Privacy (1960), California Law Review, Vol. 48 (August 1960), Iss. 3, Art. 1, p. 411.
167 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 224, at. 234.
168 See cases involving the issue of newsworthiness assessment, prior to the newsworthiness criteria applied in Kapel-
las v. Hoffman (1969): Barber v. Time (1942); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1952) ; Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1962); 
Wagner v. Fawcett Publications (1962); Time v. Hill (1967) and some others. In Kapellas v. Kofman, a so-called “three-
piece test” was announced by the California Court of Appeal: “In determining whether a particular incident is “newswor-
thy”, and thus whether te privilege shields its truthful publication from liability, the courts consider a variety of factors, 
including the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article’s intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the 
extent to which the party voluntarily acceeded to a position of public notoriety” (Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, at. 36).
169 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. (1940) 113 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940), at. 809.
170 COMMENTS: The Right to Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defence of Newsworthiness,1963, 
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 30 (1962), iss. 4, p. 725–726.
171 CASE NOTES: Torts – Invasion of Privacy – Lapse of Time and the Destruction of the Newsworthiness Privilege – 
Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F. 2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962),1964, De Paul Law Review, Vol. 13, iss. 2, article 15, 
p. 325–327.
172 Wagner v. Fawcett Publications 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962), at. 411.
173 Ibid., at. 410.
174 Ibid., at. 412.
175 Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. (1961), 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, at. 123–124.
176 The same principle was disposed in the Werner case, see Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111 at. 120.
177 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806, at. 810.
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partically outdated since the New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) case, where an “actual malice” test 
was enunciated upon which the plaintiff was required to prove actual malice of the news publication 
to recover and inaccurate statements were thereafter not automatically considered as defamatory178. 
It is substantial to append, that Alan Kaminsky (1982) stressed that in several cases, people who once 
become “public figures”, may vanish from publicity; then they may be displayed in a defamatory 
light179. As we can conceive from the Sidis case, no defamation occurred in the reflection of his early 
endeavours.
2.2. The second and third causes of action
2. The second cause of action dealt with an alleged violation of statutes, namely §§ 50-51 of New York 
Civil Rights Law180. §50 of this act proceeds as underwritten: “A person, firm or corporation that uses 
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person 
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent 
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor”. This statute owes to Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box. 
Co. case featuring a suit against an unauthorized usage of a woman’s photograph for advertising a 
brand of flour. By 1902, there was no common law right to privacy in the state of New York181. When 
reviewing the case, O’Brien denoted that although the wrongful act by the defendant was apparent, 
“there are many impertinent and disagreeable things which one may suffer from another that do not 
amount to legal injuries such as courts may redress”182. Although the court did not decide in favor of 
plaintiff, this case led to the enactment of a statute on prohibiting the use of one’s personal data (a 
name and likeness) for commercial purposes in 1903183. So was the matter with the right to privacy by 
the foregoing date184. Here we should interrogate: is a press publication an advertisement? There were 
a multitude of cases to clarify the statute. In Jeffries v. N.Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., the plaintiff 
sued the journal for publishing news regarding his released autobiography185 which allegedly violated 
the provisions Sidis referred to stating the second cause of action. The plaintiff blamed the journal 
in disposing the picture of him to enhance the circulation, which upon his claim might increase the 
value as an advertising medium. The Court stated that the provisions of the aforegiven statute refer 
to commerce or traffic, not to dissemination of information and thereby the motion was denied186. 
A similar inference was made in Colyer v. Fox Publishing Co., where an actress was not allowed to 
recover when an unauthorized photograph in a weekly periodical, where it was held as follows: “So 
far this statute has not been so far extended as to prohibit, under penalty of exemplary damages, a 
publication in a daily, weekly or periodical paper or magazine of the portrait of an individual187”. In 
178 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), at. 279–280.
179 KAMINSKY, A. Defamation Law: Once a Public Figure Always a Public Figure?,1982, Hosfra law review, 
Vol. 10, iss. 3, article 6, p. 805.
180 Ibid., at. 810–811.
181 Though recovery was denied in the Robertson case, it soonly brought to the enactment of a civil rights statute 
prohibiting the unconsented use of one’s name and likeness for trade. See. Torts. Right of Privacy. Magazine Account of 
Individual’s Past (1940), Columbia Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 7 (Nov., 1940), p. 1283, footnote 2.
182 O’BRIEN, D. The Right of Privacy (1902), Columbia Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 7 (Nov., 1902), p. 439–440.
183 KALVEN, H. Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? (1966), Law and Contemporary Problems 
(Duke Law), Vol. 31, No. 2 (1966), p. 331.
184 It was repeated in various cases that the right to privacy was unknown to ancient common law. As stated in Reed v. 
Real Detective Pub. Co, the existing law did not protect that right and the gain of privacy was subject to individual effort. 
See.: Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co, 63 Ariz. 294 (Ariz. 1945), at. 303.
185 Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co. 67 Misc 570 (N. Y. Misc 1910), at. 571.
186 Ibid.
187 Colyer v. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), at. 299.
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Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the Court also elucidated the foregoing statute: “It can 
not be contended that the publication of moving pictures is not a trade. But we think it is not such trade 
as was within the contemplation of the Legislature in the passage of the act. They are published for 
profit, as a newspaper is published for profit. Their profit depends upon their ability to present accurate 
and interesting news, as well as the photoplays of fiction. It is precisely the same with a newspaper”188. 
Again, it was well summarized in Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc.: “The publication of matters of public 
interest in newspaper or newsreels is not a trade purpose within the meaning and purview of this 
statute”189. In my point of view, the most explicit comment on this statute was featured in Sarat 
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror as well as Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers. Elucidating on the New York 
Civil Rights Law statute providing a partial protection of one’s right to privacy, Mr. Justice Shientag 
in Lahiri v. Daily Mirror stated that “<…> There may be no recovery under the statute for publication 
of a photograph in connection with an article of current news or immediate public interest <…> Such 
articles include, among others, travel stories, stories of distant placesm tales of historical personages 
and events, the reproduction of items of past news and surveys of social conditions. These are articles 
educational and informative in character. As a general rule, such cases are not within the purview 
of the statute”190. As it was held in Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers Co. in the continuation of the 
Lahiri opinion, citing: “These classifications apply, with some possible disctinctions, to books and 
magazines. It is well settled that the right of privacy does not prohibit the publication od matter whch 
is of legitimate public or general interest, although no longer current” and referred to the Sidis case191.
In the Sidis case, the Court stated that since (as of 1940) the New York state did not possess a 
common law-based right to privacy; therefore liability upon the defendant must be thereby imposed 
originating from a statute192. On grounds of a number of authorities, the Court did not consider the 
article about Sidis was executed for commercial purposes irrespective of the fact that it was recognized 
that all the newspapers actually do expect profits from selling their commodities193. The Court 
found that the activity of New Yorker magazine apparently did not fall within the scope of the given 
provisions: “so long as he [the publisher] confines himself to the unembroidered dissemination of 
facts”. Here the transgression of the aforementioned statute would occur only in case of fictionalization 
of the stories194. The issue of advertising was withdrawn by an identical root: though an advertisement 
did actually occur, the paper was not released beyond New York, the article was unobjectionable and 
the authors did not use the Sidis’s personal data as referred to in §50 of New York Civil Rights Law195. 
3. The libel issue, claimed in the last cause of action, was also withdrawn though the defendant did 
not carry out motions to dismiss it. Finally, the Court recognized that no invasion of privacy occurred 
in the Sidis case.
III. Corollary
The Sidis case was the principal one to resurrect the collision of privacy and freedom of press within 
the issue of public characters in the US common law. It also unfolded a partition of “right to be 
forgotten” to a) priorly public incidents b) ex-public figures. As it goes from the case, an ex-public 
188 Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 189 App. Div. 467 (N.Y. app. Div. 1919), at. 471.
189 Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp 746 (1936), at. 747.
190 Lahiri v Daily Mirror Inc., 162 Misc. 776 (N.Y. Misc 1937), at. 782.
191 Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 App. Div. 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950), at. 170.
192 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806, at. 810.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid., at. 811.
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figure will never be forgotten, which was later transformed into the notion “Once public – always 
public” meaning that no deed or life story of a notorious, even once-notorious person will be ever 
injunct from public view. Having discussed the case with dozens of references to other cases, I should 
make a following corrolary:
– The Sidis case displays the issue of a public interest in a person in general, but not in an 
incident s/he was involved into. Sidis strived to covert his entire prior life, not an obscure 
incident, an unsavory fragmenton from his life. The court considered that the interest in Sidis 
owing to his uncommonness may remain even after his seclusion.
–  The correlation of Melvin and Sidis cases is quite superficial albeit some similarities do virtually 
subsist – both plaintiffs tempted to conceal the past events of their lives. At the same time, the 
former case did not feature a collision with press and though the facts of the plaintiff’s live 
in the Melvin case were unfolded in public records, she had never been a public figure before 
in contrast to the plaintiff in the Sidis case. As the unauthorized disposal of one’s name or 
photograph in advertising and trade is tortious or prohibited by statute, the same can not be 
said for newspaper articles about public figures. The article about Sidis was truthful, and in 
most US jurisdictions truth serves as a defence196, including the press. The doctrine of privacy, 
enunciated in the Melvin case served for dozens of subsequent cases, including the Sidis one; at 
the same time, I should denote that the doctrine was general and was not specifically attributed 
to Melvin case. An other inference which should be undertaken is the issue of rehabilitation 
that occurred in the Melvin case but was inapplicable for the Sidis case. In criminal oblivion 
cases197, the courts considered that no violation of privacy occurred in the publication of prior 
criminal actions of the plaintiffs, who blamed news agencies for privacy infringement. Hence, 
the Sidis case has nothing to do with the notion of someone’s rehabilitation from an unsavory 
past.
– The Sidis case contributed to the issue of newsworthiness of the publication – at least, to 
a certain degree. As the Court held, the figure of Sidis constituted legitimate public interest 
owing to the fact he was a notorious person even if it was in a remote past. 
– The Sidis case provided a powerful endowment to the evolution of  the “right to be forgotten”, 
as it displayed a completely dissenting situation from the Melvin case, as it unleashed an issue 
of a public figure fadeaway. In this embrace, the case of Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. has got 
more resemblances with the Sidis case (here we should exclude the factor of several minor 
inaccuracies in the publication about the plaintiff). The practice of United States common law 
features several dozens of cases which are connected with a right to be forgotten, where the 
Sidis case seems to be one of the most outstanding ones.
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